What, Precisely, is Carter's Doomsday Argument? by McCutcheon, Randall G.
WHAT, PRECISELY, IS CARTER’S DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT?
Abstract. Paying strict attention to Brandon Carter’s several published ren-
ditions of anthropic reasoning, we present a “nutshell” version of the Doomsday
argument that is truer to Carter’s principles than the standard balls-and-urns
or otherwise “naive Bayesian” versions that proliferate in the literature. At
modest cost in terms of complication, the argument avoids commitment to
many of the half-truths that have inspired so many to rise up against other
toy versions, never adopting posterior outside of the convex hull of one’s prior
distribution over the “true chance” of Doom. The hyper-pessimistic position
of the standard balls-and-urn presentation and the hyper-optimistic position
of naive self-indicators are seen to arise from dubiously extreme prior distribu-
tions, leaving room for a more satisfying and plausible intermediate solution.
1. Introduction
Anthropic reasoning principles leading eventually to one version of the so-called
Doomsday Argument (see also Gott 1993, Nielson 1989) arose in the seventies in
two papers by theoretical physicists (Collins and Hawking 1973, Carter 1974).
Brandon Carter in particular is often credited as the most important early propo-
nent of this sort of reasoning in general and the Doomsday argument in particular.
Leslie (1989, 1992, 1996), “working only from rumours about how Carter was run-
ning it”, proposed a balls-and-urn version of the Doomsday argument. Bostrom
(1999, 2001) presents similar “nutshell” cases. The following is representative:
Doomsday: Assume two equally likely scenarios: humanity will suffer extinction
sooner (Quick Doom), in which case there will be a total of 200 billion humans,
or humanity will suffer extinction later (Later Doom), in which case there will
be a total of 200 trillion humans. You learn first that you are a member of this
indeterminately sized population. At this point your credence in Quick Doom is
1
2
. Next, you learn that you are among the first 200 billion humans. That fact,
conditional on Quick Doom, has probability one. Conditional on Later Doom,
it has probability 1
1000
. Therefore, you ought to update your credence in Quick
Doom to 1000
1001
by, e.g., Bayes’ Theorem:
P (Q|E) = P (Q)P (E|Q)
P (Q)P (E|Q) + P (L)P (E|L) =
1
2
· 1
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
1000
=
1000
1001
.
(Here Q = Quick Doom, L = Later Doom and E = Early Birth Rank.)
Proceeding from the assumption that this is his argument, it would be very easy
to get the impression (as many have) that Carter is badly mistaken. One might
reach this conclusion, for example, by considering an augmentation in which for
each “civilization” in an infinite cosmos, a fair coin is tossed once the population
reaches 200 billion. If heads, the civilization is destroyed. If tails, the civilization is
destroyed when the population reaches 200 trillion. The mistake in Doomsday,
1
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one then reasons, is that at the point where you have learned you are human, but
have yet to learn your birth rank, your credence in Later Doom should be exactly
one thousand times greater than your credence in Quick Doom, for the reason
that (in any large enough region) one expects that one thousand times fewer of
your epistemic counterparts’ civilizations suffer early extinction than do not.1
But Doomsday is an oversimplification–an extreme case of what Carter (1983)
actually describes.2 We don’t claim that Leslie and Bostrom are confused on
this point; each makes numerous qualifications and offers scenarios in which the
Bayesian calculation of Doomsday is taken not to apply. Neither, however, offers
an argument that is both general enough to avoid the need for qualification and
formal enough to satisfy skeptics who insist that the favoring of Quick Doom be
rendered in some sort of “rigorous calculation”.3 Our purpose here is to show
what such a calculation looks like. This will expose, in particular, that Carter
wasn’t wrong at all–not, at least, for any of the reasons these skeptics have offered.
2. Carter’s anthropic principle
Carter (1983) contains a concise formulation of the anthropic principle:
“In a typical application of the anthropic (self-selection) principle, one is
engaged in a scientific discrimination process of the usual kind in which one
wishes to compare the plausibility of a set of alternative hypotheses, H(Ti),
say, to the effect that respectively one or other of a corresponding set of
theories T1, T2, . . . is valid for some particular application in the light of
some observational or experimental evidence E, say. Such a situation can
be analysed in a traditional Bayesian framework by attributing a priori
and a posteriori plausibility values (i.e. formal probability measures),
denoted by pE and pS, say, to each hypothesis respectively before and
after the evidence E is taken into account, so that for any particular
result X one has
pE(X) = pS(X|E),
the standard symbol | indicating conditionality. According to the usual
Bayesian formula, the relative plausibility of two theories A and B, say, is
modified by a factor equal to the ratio of the corresponding conditional a
priori probabilities pS(E|A) and pS(E|B) for the occurrence of the result
E in the theories, i.e.
(1)
pE(A)
pE(B)
=
pS(E|A)
pS(E|B)
pS(A)
pS(B)
.”
1Such “self indication” (Bostrom’s terminology) reasoning is employed by Dieks (1992),
Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and others in direct response to Doomsday, and appears to
be closely aligned with the majority thirder response to the so-called “Sleeping Beauty” prob-
lem. Bostrom’s (1999) thought-experiment (the Presumptuous Philosopher) cautions against its
too-liberal application, and is the most effective apologetic for Carter’s methods we know of.
2By analogy with other cases of anthropic reasoning; he didn’t publish on Doomsday per se.
3Leslie (1996) has on this point suggested that there isn’t need of a formal mathematical
presentation, but decades of entrenchment and thousands of pages of spilt ink suggest otherwise.
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Carter stresses that the “Selected” or “Subjective” probability function pS in (1) is
related to an “Original” or “Objective” probability function pO by pS(·) = pO(·|S),
“where S denotes the totality of all the selection conditions that are implied by the
hypothesis of application of the theory to a concrete experimental or observational
situation, but which are not necessarily included in the abstract theory” on which
pO is based. In all three of the examples discussed in Carter (1983), one has
pS(E|A)
pS(E|B) 6=
pO(E|A)
pO(E|B) ;
indeed, this is the hallmark of anthropic reasoning as Carter understands it.
It’s worth examining Carter’s explanation for this in the first of these examples,
which he takes to be “the classic example of an argument based on the anthropic
principle”. Here A is the hypothesis to the effect that the development of life is
of common occurrence on ‘habitable’ planets, B is the hypothesis that life is very
rare, even in favorable conditions, and E is the evidence consisting of the fact
that on the only obviously ‘habitable’ planet we have yet been able to observe,
namely our own, life does indeed exist.
“If future astronomical progress should one day enable us to observe a sec-
ond example of occurrence of life on a randomly chosen ‘habitable planet’
belonging to a not too distant star in our Galaxy, the corresponding ab
initio probability ratio, pO(E|A)
pO(E|B) >> 1, would justify the induction that hy-
pothesis A (that life is common) was the most likely. However, so long as
the only example at our disposal is our own, no such inference is permissi-
ble, since the anthropic selection principle ensures, as a virtual tautology,.
that one of the a priori conditions, S, that must be satisfied by the first
planet available for investigation by us must be the prior occurrence of
life, namely our own. Thus as in the previous example we obtain not
only pS(E|A) = 1 but also pS(E|B) = 1, so that our observation has no
discriminating power at all, and both...A and B remain equally viable.”
In a second example B is the hypothesis to the effect that gravitational coupling
strength is fixed across time, while the evidence E is that of a seemingly fortu-
itous mathematical relationship between the Hubble time and the gravitational
coupling constant. (Hypothesis A is that coupling strength increases across time
to preserve this relationship.) According to Carter, in this case pO(E|B) << 1
since the relationship can hold only in one particular epoch under the hypothesis
that the coupling strength doesn’t vary, but pS(E|B) ≈ pS(E|A) = 1 since “bi-
ological systems based on the same principles as our own” won’t exist in times
where the relationship doesn’t hold. That is, the anthropic selection principle
ensures that the seemingly fortuitous relationship between Hubble time and the
gravitational coupling constant must be observed. As in the first example, then,
hypothesis A is not confirmed by the observation.
In the third and final example, A is the hypothesis to the effect that the expected
average time t intrisically most likely for the evolution of a system of observers
intelligent enough to comprise a scientific civilization such as our own is geomet-
rically small relative to the main sequence lifetime τ of a typical star, during
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which the energy output can maintain favorable conditions for life; hypothesis B
is that t is geometrically large relative to τ . Now E is the evidence that the time
te ≈ 4 billion years necessary for the evolution of intelligent life on Earth is on the
same order of magnitude (i.e. geometrically comparable) as the estimated main
sequence lifetime τ0 ≈ 10 billion years of the Sun. In this case, Carter would have
us accept that p0(E|A) and p0(E|B) are both very small (and plausibly near each
other). On the other hand pS(E|B) ≈ 1 (so that in particular B is confirmed at
the expense of A by the observations), as Carter explains in this passage:
“...the observation that te is comparable with the upper limit τ0 is just
what would be expected if we adopt the alternative hypothesis that the
intrinsically expected time t is much longer than τ0: in this case self-
selection ensures that ours must be one of the exceptional cases in which
evolution has proceeded much faster than usual; (...) there is no particular
reason why we should belong to the even more exceptional cases in which
evolution proceeds even more rapidly although, with the assumption that
the Universe is infinite, such cases must of course exist.”
We note two features common to these examples.
First, in all of these cases pS(E|A)
pS(E|B) <
pO(E|A)
pO(E|B) ; because observations must occur
from the first person perspectives of life forms in some respects similar to us, they
are systematically predisposed to favor, conditional on B, positions, situation or
scenarios consistent with E–despite the fact that positions, situations or scenarios
consistent with E might be comparatively rare conditional on B. (For A as well,
perhaps, but relatively more dramatically for B.) For this reason one should not,
despite this comparative rarity, discredit B on the basis of an observation of E.
After all, that the first observation made would be consistent with E is exactly
what one should expect conditional on B, regardless of what vast volumes of
spacetime one might have to scour in order to locate such an observation.
Second, the ratio pS(A)
pS(B)
is assumed to be equal to pO(A)
pO(B)
. That is to say, the concrete
“selection conditions” aren’t taken to favor the hypothesis A over the hypothesis
B on the basis that “more” (in the sense of density if not actual numbers, in the
apparently default case that the Universe is assumed infinite conditional on either
hypothesis) observers are predicted conditional on A than on B. Here is where it
is essential that A and B are “theories”, i.e. families of probability laws on the
set of complete Universe trajectories. Note that if, to the contrary, A and B were
chance events or ineliminably indexical assertions (heads and tails or Quick Doom
and Later Doom, for example), this assumption would run counter to frequentist
views of credence.4 As it stands, the assumption is consistent with the majority
4Compare Sleeping Beauty or the objections to Doomsday in Section 1 related to sequences
of civilization in an infinite cosmos. Note however that Bostrom (1999) and possibly Leslie
believe that whether such frequentist reasoning is appropriate in Doomsday is sensitive to the
actual presence of said “outsiders”, i.e. other civilizations. Since Carter seems unconcerned that
the infinitude of the Universe might affect his analyses, I have assumed that he would regard
this issue as a red herring, and be sympathetic to the “theory” distinction alone. Compare also
Antony Lewis’s SIA-C (Lewis 2001), which applies “within different probabilistic outcomes of
a correct theory”, does not favor “wrong theories with a larger number of observers” (i.e. isn’t
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response (no skewing of prior credences in favor of theories associated with greater
expected population) to Bostrom’s “Presumptuous Philosopher” experiment.5
3. An adequate formalization of Carter’s Doomsday argument
Before proceeding to my formulation of Carter’s Doomsday argument, I shall give
a brief example showing how (1) is to be used. Consider a coin whose behavior is
known to be correctly described by one of two theories. The first theory is “the
probability that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is 1
2
, independently of
how it lands on other tosses” (call this theory T1/2). The second is “the probability
that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is 1
3
, independently of how it lands
on other tosses” (call this theory T1/3). Say that, initially, we are indifferent as
to which theory is true. That is, pS(T1/2) =
1
2
= pS(T1/3).
Suppose next that we observe E, i.e. that the coin presently lands heads when
tossed. By (1), we have:
pE(T1/2)
pE(T1/3)
=
pS(E|T1/2)
pS(E|T1/3)
pS(T1/2)
pS(T1/3)
=
(1/2)
(1/3)
(1/2)
(1/2)
=
3
2
.
Then our posterior credences in the two theories under consideration are pE(T1/2) =
3
5
and pE(T1/3) =
2
5
, respectively.
Note that, by virtue of affecting one’s credences in rival theories, the present
observation of a chance event (such as heads) may affect one’s credence in another
chance event. To return to our example (where E is the event that a present toss
lands heads), let F be the event that a subsequent toss will land heads. Then
pS(F ) = pS(T1/2)pS(F |T1/2) + pS(T1/3)pS(F |T1/3) = 1
2
· 1
2
+
1
2
· 1
3
=
5
12
,
whereas
pE(F ) = pE(T1/2)pE(F |T1/2) + pE(T1/3)pE(F |T1/3) = 3
5
· 1
2
+
2
5
· 1
3
=
13
30
.
We are now ready to proceed. In the following, I shall restrict application of
(1) to the only sort of hypotheses implicitly sanctioned by Carter’s own practice:
hypotheses to the effect that one or another competing theory is true. In order to
avoid straying too far away from the format of Doomsday (which might compli-
cate comparison), I shall carry over the assumption that for human-like species
there are only two equally (from an “outside” perspective) likely possibilities:
Quick Doom (population 200 billion) and Later Doom (population 200 trillion).
“Presumptuous”) and agrees with “the frequentist probability” if you “make many universes”–
e.g. countably iterate a finite Universe under a single theory.
5I would urge more entrenched proponents of rival anthropic practices to grant some leeway
here...perhaps view the whole paper as more descriptive than normative. (Though I do happen to
believe that Carter is right, there’s a reason I didn’t entitle the paper “Why Carter’s Doomsday
Argument is Right”.) I’m mainly trying to make it clear, by looking at a succession of examples,
that Carter only employs (1) in cases where A and B are competing theories (as I’ve defined this
notion); in particular, in cases in which one has no actual or nomologically possible counterparts
for whomA andB have different truth values than they actually have. I don’t claim to be making
any advance on the “Presumptuous Philosopher” intuitions that this practice is “correct”.
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The theories grounding the competing hypotheses for consideration in (1) that
I shall consider are given by {Tx : x ∈ [0, 1]}, where Tx is the assertion that
the expected (and almost sure, should the Universe be infinite) density6 of Quick
Doom in human-like species, conditional on the actual complete theory, is x. Of
course for a unique xa ∈ [0, 1], Txa is the “correct” theory. Since the agent judges
Quick Doom and Later Doom to be equally likely for any given human-like species,
the expectation of xa (from an “outside” perspective) is
1
2
. On the other hand one
should allow for the agent’s distribution for xa to be potentially continuous and
quite diffuse, for one cannot necessarily anticipate the extent to which the agent
will be able to discredit, from first principles, potential (regions of) values for xa.
Denote the probability density function for this distribution by g : [0, 1]→ [0,∞).
Now according to (1), upon observation of E = my birth rank is at most 200
billion, one ought to multiply the density function g by a factor proportional7 to
pS(E|Tx) = 200, 000, 000, 000x+ 200, 000, 000, 000(1− x)
200, 000, 000, 000x+ 200, 000, 000, 000, 000(1− x) =
1
1000− 999x.
That is to say, the agent’s posterior density function for xa will be
h(x) =
kg(x)
1000− 999x, where k =
(∫ 1
0
g(x)
1000− 999x dx
)−1
.
Posterior credence in Quick Doom is now just posterior expectation of xa, i.e.
pE(D1) =
∫ 1
0
xh(x) dx.
Examples:8
1. Let g(x) = 6x(1− x). Then h(x) ≈ 6x(1−x)
.0029674(1000−999x) and
pE(D1) =
∫ 1
0
xh(x) dx ≈
∫ 1
0
6x2(1− x)
.0029674(1000− 999x) dx ≈ .663683.
2. Let g(x) = 1, i.e. the uniform prior. Then h(x) = 999
ln(1000)(1000−999x) and
pE(D1) =
∫ 1
0
xh(x) dx =
∫ 1
0
999x
ln(1000)(1000− 999x) dx ≈ .856236.
6For those who might be squeamish about densities, substitute “ideal subjective probability
of” (still conditional on the actual complete theory).
7A referee: “Perhaps you’re just using Bayes Theorem here, not (1).” It’s (1). Note in
particular that h(x)h(y) = lim→0
pE(T[x,x+))
pE(T[y,y+))
= lim→0
pS(E|T[x,x+))
pS(E|T[y,y+))
pS(T[x,x+))
pS(T[y,y+))
= g(x)g(y)
pS(E|Tx)
pS(E|Ty) a.e.
8There is no implicit claim that the below distributions have direct relevance to our problem.
They are simply common distributions (1 and 4 are Dirichlet distributions, 2 and 3 are uniform
distributions of two different sorts) exhibiting a variety of concentration patterns. We’re calling
attention to the dependence of Quick Doom’s posterior credence on the pattern of concentration.
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3. Let g(x) = k(ln(1 − x) − lnx) for 0 < x ≤ 1
2
, g(x) = k(lnx − ln(1 − x)) for
1
2
< x < 1, where k ≈ 1.386284. Then h(x) ≈ g(x)
.0184138(1000−999x) , and
pE(D1) =
∫ 1
0
xh(x) dx ≈
∫ 1
0
xg(x)
.0184138(1000− 999x) dx ≈ .946642.
4. Let g(x) = 1
pi
√
x(1−x) . Then h(x) =
10
√
10
pi
√
x(1−x)(1000−999x) and
pE(D1) =
∫ 1
0
xh(x) dx =
∫ 1
0
10
√
10x
pi
√
x(1− x)(1000− 999x) dx ≈ .969347.
Though all non-singular distributions favor Quick Doom to some degree, this
argument will never violate our intuitions by adopting a posterior credence outside
the convex hull of our prior support for the true probability of Quick Doom.9 As
to which distribution is apt, there is anecdotal evidence that Carter (1983) would
opt for one concentrated toward the extremes. To wit:
“...the very complicated mechanisms governing the evolution of living sys-
tems cannot yet be analysed, still less predicted, in other than very vague
qualitative terms. We certainly do not know enough to predict from first
principles whether the expected average time t which would be intrinsi-
cally most likely for the evolution of a system of ‘intelligent observers’, in
the form of a scientific civilization such as our own, should take much less
or much more time than is allowed by the external restraints that limit
the duration of favourable conditions. In such a state of ignorance, both
of these two alternative possibilities should therefore be retained for con-
sideration as not implausible a priori. Only the intermediate borderline
case, in which the intrinsically most likely evolution time came out to be
of just the same order as the time allowed by external restraints, could be
set aside in advance, as being much less plausible a priori...”
Reasoning similarly in the current case, one arrives at a posterior credence in
Later Doom of perhaps just a few percent, as in the latter two examples above.
4. Conclusion
Apart from the historical virtue of coinciding with Carter’s original intention,
the precisification of the Doomsday Argument given here exhibits two additional
virtues. First, since the main extant rival positions appear as its extreme cases,
the argument dissolves theoretical quarrels and entreats parties to relocate dis-
agreement about the relative likelihood of “Early Doom” to a more plausible
venue: namely, the different attitudes they may bring to bear on actual threats
(wars, diseases, malevolent computers, high energy physics disasters, etc.)
Second, the argument given here has a vigorous claim to soundness. Getting peo-
ple to take the argument seriously has been a problem for Doomsday proponents,
9As the expectation of ideal subjective probability, rational credence should never fall outside
the support of ideal subjective probability’s distribution; Carter’s anthropic principle teaches
that while selection effects may alter this distribution, they ought never to expand its support.
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as Bostrom (1996) notes: “When people first encounter (Doomsday)...what hap-
pens is that most of them think that it is obviously false. Then any sign of consen-
sus disappears when it comes to explaining what is wrong with it.” Admittedly,
this property does seem characteristic of “good philosophical puzzles”. Not if it’s
an artifact of oversimplified presentation, however, as is the case here.
We’ve maintained that the Doomsday argument as envisioned by Carter may be
sound, but that its popularizers and the majority who have thought the argument
“obviously false” have been talking past each other. If our nutshell presentation
can boost majority confidence that this debate will soon reach its end (owing to
the deaths of everyone on Earth), that ought to at least qualify as a silver lining.
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